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CASE COMMENTS
ABDuarIO -ABIIrT
TO CoNssr.-Defendant was accused of detaining a woman against her will. Defendant urged that the act was
done with her consent. Against this the prosecution insisted that she
was mentally incompetent to consent. Held, that if prosecuting witness did not have sufficient mentality to enable her to consent it was a
question for the jury whether or not the defendant knew this at the
time of the occasions complained of, or should reasonably have known
it, and if he did not know of her mental weakness and had no reasonable grounds for believing the prosecuting witness to be weak-minded,
and in good faith he acted with her 'as a sane person, then he was not
guilty of the offense charged. Price v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 628,
20 S. W. (2nd) 456.
Kentucky Statutes, Sec. 1158, declares that whoever shall unlawfully take or detain any woman against her will with intent to have
carnal knowledge of her shall be guilty of the statutory offense.
This statute creates a lesser offense than rape or attempt to commit
rape. Evans v. Commonwealth, 79 Ky. 414, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 30.
Under this statute it is essential that the detention be against the
will of the woman, though the detainer may not intend to have sexual
intercourse unless the consent of the woman is obtained. Payner v.
Commonwealth, 19 S. W. 927.
If the prosecuting witness in the instant case were of such weak
mentality as not to know the nature of the act then any detention of
her with intent of such act would have been without her consent. In
Malone v. Commonwealth, 91 Ky. 307, 15 S. W. 856, it was -held that
"against her will" meant "without her consent" so that acts against
a sleeping girl were against her will. In Higgins v. Commonwealth,
94 Ky. 54, 21 S. W. 927, it was held that where a woman is insane all
acts are against her will which are not acts of kindness, courtesy or
friendship. From this it would appear that the acts complained of were
against the will of the prosecuting witness.
In Beaver v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 246, 80 S. W. 968, a
leading case in this and other jurisdictions, cited by this court, it was
held that if the jury believed from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the prosecuting witness was in such feeble and weak mind
at the time that she did not know the nature of the act of havtng
carnal knowledge and for that reason not able to consent then any act
of detention with the purpose of having carnal knowledge of her was
done against her will, but further if the ordinary prudent man would
have thought her consenting and if the defendant did not know or
have reasonable grounds for believing her weak minded, and in good
faith acted with her as a sane person then the law is for the defendant.
As to the necessity of knowledge on the part of the defendant of
the condition of the prosecuting witness' mentality the' cases are not.
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as numerous under this special statutory offense as they are in the
analogous situation in rape cases. Here the better rule is found to be
the same as stated by the court for detention cases in Beaven v. Commonwealth, supra, and the case under comment. State v. Warren, 232
Mo. 185, 134 S. W. 522; State v. Heldere, 186 S. W. 696. Some cases
may be found contra, however, People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 P. 711.
The former rule, however, is the weight of authority and better in
principle. See note in L. R. A. 1916F at 742.
R. M. 0.
AnmqIsTRATiVm LAW-R riw-CozrmoEcy OF EvmENcE-Plaiutiff, a workman, was injured while in the employ of the defendant
company. Both parties had accepted the Workmen's Compensation Law
(Ky. Sthts., Sec. 4880 et seq.), and in accordance with the same the
plaintiff applied to the board organized thereunder for the payment of
compensation. From the decision of such board an appeal was taken.
Held, the Workmen's Compensation Board could not make a finding of
fact without competent evidence to support it. Broadway " Fourth
Avenue Realty Company v. Metcalfe, 230 Ky. 800, 20 S. W. (2nd) 988.
The primary object in passing the Workmen's Compensation Act
was to provide a speedy and final settlement of claims for injuries
due to industrial accidents. To secure this end it is absolutely necessary that where the administration of such law is placed in the hands
of a board, the findings and awards of such board shall be as far as
possible the last expressions required and should stand unmolested by
-the courts. Some check, however, is needed to prevent the board from
acting arbitrarily and it is in this connection that the question of how
far the courts will go in reviewing the decisions and awards of the
board, arises.
The earlier Kentucky cases hold that where the reviewing court is
unable to say there is an entire absence of evidence to support the
board's finding of facts, such finding in the absence of fraud is conclusive and not subject to review. Robinson-Petter Company v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 201 Ky. 719. 258 S. W. 318; Beaver Ddm
Coal Company v. Hocker, 202 Ky. 398, 259 S. W. 1010; Northwest coal
Company v. Castle, 202 Ky. 505, 260 S.W. 336; Rusch v. Louisville Water
Company, 193 Ky. 698, 237 S. W. 389. The later Kentucky decisions seem
to slightly extend the scope of review by requiring the evidence to be
competent. Consolidated Coal Company v. Ratliff, 217 Ky. 103, 288 S.
W. 1057; J7. L. Smith Coal Company v. Hawkins, 222 Ky. 284, 300 S. W.
609; Colenan Mining Company v. Wicks, 213 Ky. 134, 280 S. W. 936. The
court has defined "evidence"' as "something of substance and relevant
consequence; and not vague, uncertain, or irrelevant matter not carrying the quality of proof or having fitness tt induce cOnviction." HarlanWallins Coal Company v. Carr, 220 Ky. 785, 295 S. W. i017. Irearsav
evidence alone has been held not sufficient to support a finding. Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37, 228 S. W. 1036. Circumstantial videnjce
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may, however, be suificient. Big Elkhorn, Coal Company v. Burke, 206
Ky. 489, 267 S. W. 142.
The Kentucky rule is supported by the overwhelming weight of
authority. Perkinson v. Industrial Commission, 305 Ill. 625; G-uthrie v.
Iowa Gas Company, 200 Iowa 150, 204 N. W. 225; Carroll v. Kniolkerbocker Ice Company, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1, 169 App. Div. 450; Aetna Life
Insurance Company v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 415, 231 P. 442;
Meyers v. Michigan Central R. Company, 199 Mich. 134, 165 N. W. 703;
.Iiflson v. Ross, 38 R. 1. 145, 94 At1. 717. It is submitted that the rule
of the instant case is the best that could be formulated on the subject
since to allow the court to receive and weigh the whole of the evidence
would be to substitute the opinion of the court for that of a body of
experts, and to deny any review whatsoever would be to permit the
board to act arbitrarily and according to whim and caprice.
E. . A.
BILLs AND NoTns-HLDEa IN DUE CouRsE.-Plaintiff bought note
sued on at sale of assets of bankrupt payee. It had been endorsed to
bank as collateral security for loan to payee. It was transferred to
plaintiff by the bank, after maturity, the former having paid the bank
the amount of the loan for which the note was held. Defendant, who
was the maker, alleged that note was obtained through fraud and that
when it was transferred to the plaintiff, the latter was on notice.
Held: If plaintiff was on notice of fraud and being a transfer after
maturity, he was holder in due course only to the extent of the amount
for which his transferor held the note as security; apad that he could
recover the full amount of the note unless it was in fact obtained
through fraud, or was executed without consideration. Thomas v.
Siddens, 230 Ky. 651, 20 S. W. (2d) 482.
The Kentucky Negotiable Instruments Act, section 3720b-58 provides: "In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course,
a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were
non-negotiable. But a holder who derives his title through a holder
in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument has all the rights of such former holder in
respect of all parties prior to the latter." And, section 3720b-27 provides: "Where the holder has a lien on the instrument, arising either
from contract or by implication of law, he is deemed a holder for value
to the extent of his lien." But aside from the last quoted statute it is
admitted that the bank was a holder in due course and applying the
provisions of 3720b58 (supra) the plaintiff holds, "if he is not himself
a party to any fraud . . . affecting the instrument . . ."ojily
to
the extent of the bank's lien, since he took after maturity.
Under the Ky. Neg. Inst. Act, sections 3720b-52 and 58, the makers
of a note are entitled to the same defenses against an assignee after
due date as they could employ against the original payee. Barnard v.
Napier, 167 Ky. 824, 171 S. W. 624. Ad where one buys a promissory
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note after maturity, it becomes, under sect. 58 (supra) of the Neg. Inst.
Act, subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. Austin
v. First National Bank of Scottsville, 150 Ky. 113, 150 S. W. S. Also
see Sparr v. Fulton National Bank, 179 Ky. 755, 201 S. W. 310.
The Pennsylvania Neg. Inst. Law contains the identical section
which has been referred to. Pa. St. 1920 sect. 16048. In interpreting
that section in the case of Putnam v. Ensign Oil Co., 272 Pa. 301, 116
Atl. 285, it was held "A negotiable instrument gives substantial rights
to one'who derives his title through a holder in due course, provided
the former has not been guilty of any fraud or illegal act. A note in
the hands of a holder other than in due course is subject to the same
defenses as if it was non-negotiable, except where he derives his title
through a holder in due course, and has not been guilty of any fraud
or illegality affecting the instrument. In such cases he has all the
rights of a former holder, (in due course) in respect of all prior indorsees or makers."
In interpreting section 58 (supra) of the Neg. Inst. Act it has been
held that that section does not impair the negotiability of an overdue
note. Clark v. Wheeler, 121 Atl. 588, (N. H.); Brannon, Neg. Inst.
C. E. B.
Law., sect. 58, pg. 499.
CoNsTrrUTIoNAL LAw-CORPORATION AS PERsox WITH

OF FOURTEE'TH

PROVISIONS

AmND=Tmm.-Plaintiff, a corporate surety company

of Maryland, became surety on official and revenue bond of sheriff.
Some time later, in an effort to avail itself of remedy given by Ky.
Stats., sec. 4659, for cancellation of its bond and for indemnification
bond as security against past defalcations, it gave due notice and
made proper motion in county court. The motion was overruled and
the action taken to the circuit court where relief was again denied.
Plaintiff then appealed to this court alleging among other things that
the constructioin given by Ky. Stats., sec. 4659 in the case of U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Paxton, 142 Ky. 361, 134 S. W. 481, was
unsound and should be overruled and that such construction renders
the whole statute illegal, as in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Held: Due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to corporations as
well as to individuals and that the Paxton case (supra) should be overruled. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. Logan, 230 Ky.
776, 20 S. W. (2nd) 753.
The provisions of Ky. Stats., sec. 4659, known as the "surety statute" and of sec. 723, the "enabling statute" are necessary to a clear
discussion of the point which we are to review.
Sect. 4659 provides, "If a surety on an official bond .......
wishes to be relieved from future liability and to obtain indemnity
for such as may have been incurred, or either, he may, by written
.....
.. to appear
notice to the principal obligor require him .
before the court in which the original bond was given or in whose
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clerk's office the same is required to be kept, or if the bond was not
given in any court, or required to be kept in any office, then before
the circuit court for the county in which the principal resides.
Section 723 became a law before the above statute was passed
and provides, "And it shall be lawful for said company (all guaranty and surety companies which are authorized by the body of the
section to become sureties on official and fiduciary bonds) to stipulate
and provide for indemnity from the parties aforesaid for whom they
shall so become responsible, and to enforce any bond, contract, agreement, pledge or other security made or given for that purpose."
In the Paxton case (supra), section 723, known as the enabling
statute, was construed to mean that if a surety company desired to
be in a position to demand indemnity from its principal it must so
stipulate in the contract, and if it failed to do so, it could not later
require its principal to indemnify it. Hence, as the court very ably
points out, if the construction of the enabling statute as laid down in
the Paxton case be followed, the effect of such a constriction is to discriminate against corporate sureties in favor of individual ones, for
under that doctrine the remedies provided for in the "surety statute"
(sect. 4659) will not be available to corporate sureties, which is a
clear violation of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The 14th Amendment denies the right of a state to enact or enforce any law "which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States," and it inhibits any state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law," and from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law."
That a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the 14th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution is too well settled to require
any discussion. Pembina Con. Silver M. & M. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U. S. 181, 31 L. Ed. 650; Missouri Pac. Fly. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S.
205, 32 L. Ed. 107; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. 722. And as stated in
the opinion, a very recent case involving the particular point in
question is that of Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 71 L.
Ed. 1165.
And although the "surety statute" (sect. 4659) does not expressly
mention the word corporation, it has repeatedly been held that a statutory provision using the word "person" and not referring to "corporation" in express terms, includes the latter, the rule being that when
a constitutional or statutory provision confers a right or imposes a
duty or liability upon any person generally, without referring to corporations, it applies to corporations as well as to natural persons if they
are within its reason and purpose, and are not expressly excluded.
Ballatine, Private Corporations, sect. 8, pages 42-43; Crafford v. Supervisors of Warwick County, 37 Va. 110, 12 S. E. 147; 10 L. R. A. 1029;
Peo. ex rel. N. Y. H. & R. Co. v. Barker, 140 N. Y. 437; 35 N. E. 657;
Ficker v. Amer. L. & Tr. Co., 140 Mass. 346, 5 N. E. 234; Chapman v.
Brewer, 43 Nebr. 890, 61 N. W. 637.
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A foreign corporation is a "person" within the meaning of both
the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Const.
Amend. 14. Ky. Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262
U. S. 544, 67 L. Ed. 1112. A corporation is not a "person!' under the
5th Amendment to the Federal Constitution that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and
does not enjoy the same immunity that individuals have from producing their books and records for examination before a federal grand
jury engaged in investigating their conduct in relation to the federal
criminal law. Ballantine, Priv. Corporations, sect. 8, page 43. Nor
is a corporation a citizen within the meaning of article 4 of the constitution, declaring that citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357. A corporation is, however, entitled to immunity under the 4th Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures without a valid search warrant. Hale v. Henkel,
201 U. S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652.
The law of suretyship grew up around a situation where practically all sureties were voluntary individuals and we submit that if
it was the intended purpose of the legislature, to provide by section
723 (supra), that corporate sureties were to be taken from the rule
of the common law, i. e., that sureties shall be entitled to indemnification, by providing that indemnification may be had only when stipulated for by contract, that it could have done so by providing that
all compensated sureties, corporate or otherwise, shall be indemnified
only when so stipulated in the contract. We submit that there would
be no constitutional violation in such a provision.
C. E. B.
CoNTRAcTs-ORAL CoNmTios.-Defendant signed a written proposition to exchange property owned jointly by him and two others.
Upon defendant's refusal to exchange plaintiff sued, and defendant
offered to prove an oral condition by which the contract was not to be
binding upon him until it was signed by the defendant's co-owners.
Held: If the written proposition, signed only by defendant, was upon
condition that it was not to be binding or to be accepted by the plaintiff until it was also signed by the joint owners, the defendant would
not be bound until it was so signed, if the plaintiff had knowledge of
that fact before he accepted it. Struck v. Dralle, 230 Ky. 393, 20 S. W.
(2d) 88.
The rule is well settled in this state by a long line of decisions
that parol evidence may be admitted to show that a contract was
entered into upon the condition that it was not to become binding
until the happening of a certain contingency, and under such conditions the contract is not binding until the condition is performed if
both parties know of it; nor does the admission of oral evidence of
such an agreement violate the parol evidence rule. Caudle v. Ford,
24 Ky. Law Rep. 1746, 72 S. W. 270; Vance V. 'Dobson, 205 Ky. 640,
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266 S. W. 368; Lincoln v. Burbank, 218 Ky. 89, 290 S. W..1081. This
does not amount to an admission of oral evidence to vary the written
conditions of the contract, but merely to show that there was a condition precedent to its being a binding agreement. Many of the cases
Which consider this point are collected and reviewed in Dils v. Bank
of Pikeville, 60 S. W. (Ky.) 715.
It seems that the weight of authority in this country is in accord
with the principal case, Burke v. Dulaney, 153 U. S. 228; Standard
Sewing Machine Co. v. Rainwater, 146 Ark. 81, 225 S. W. 326; Robertson v. Ramsay, 298 F. 557; Weber v. Hall Bros. 231 Mich 493, 204
N. W. 153; Thomas Nelson & Sons Pub. Co. v. Bonner, 200 N. Y. S.
341, but there are-a number of cases that might seem to be contra,
Morgan v. Howard Realty Co., 68 Colo. 414, 191 P. 114; Hill v. Smith,
75 Pa. Super. Ct. 340; Rhodes v. Owens, 101 Wash. 324, 172 P. 241.
Some of these cases that have been considered contra seem to think
that such evidence varies the conditions of the written instrument.
E. D. D.
ConRPoATIoNs-DIsmEGARDIG

THE

CoRponATE ErNTr.-The

City of

Paintsville sued the Hatfield Construction Company to recover damages for injuries done to its streets by speeding overloaded trucks.
The defendant contends that the damages were done by the T. Company
which it had employed to haul material from the railroad to the road
it was then constructing. The City contends that the T. Company
was a mere dummy formed to protect the defendant. Defendant owned
48% of the stock of the T. Company, but the T. Company had its own
name painted on the-trucks and paid its own bills. Held: The T.
Company was an independent contractor and not a mere du~nmy of
the defendant. Hatfield Construction Co. v. City of Paintsville, 230
Ky. 750, 20 S. W. (2d) 713.
This is a clear case of disregarding the corporate entity or as
sometimes is said "piercing the corporate veil."
A corporation is an entity, irrespective of the persons who own
all its stock. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 606;
Ulner v. Lime Rock R. Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 A. 1001; State v. Tocoma
Ry. & Power Co., 61 Wash. 507, 112 P. 506; Aiello v. Crampton, 201
F. 891. We must admit that the legal entity' theory is more than a
fiction. The very charactertistics of a corporation and the purposes
of incorporation show this to be true. As corporation law has grown
so also has the view concerning the legal entity. The corporate entity
must be pierced in many cases. The difficult problem is to determine
when these cases arise. The entity was first disregarded to prevent
fraud. Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139. The facts of each case determine
whether or not the entity will be cast aside. The theory should not
be lightly disregarded, but there should be a strong and logical reason
for the court's decision.
After Booth v. Bunce, supra, courts of equity disregarded the con-
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cept in order to bring about the greatest equitable results under the
facts presented. The concept is treated in equity as a means of work
ing out the interests of the real parties in interest. Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Barber, 67 Nebr. 644, 93 N. W. 1024. From the opinion given in
Donovan v. Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 336, it is shown that the
courts of law will pierce the corporate veil as quickly as a court of
equity. Wenbon Estate v. Hewlett, 193 Calif., 675, 227 P. 723. In the
instant case the law court disregarded the entity and looked to the
real parties in interest thereby reaching the only possible just result.
This case goes far to pierce the veil. However, no reasonable man
could logically contend that a just result could have been achieved by
adhering to the concept. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. V. Commonwealth,
supra, indicates that the equity court in Kentucky has long cast aside
the entity to reach just results. In case of a recovery by the corporation, the equity court does not lose sight of the fact that the stockholders are the real beneficiaries of such a recovery, and it is careful
to see if they are equitably entitled to the fruits recovered in its
behalf by the corporation. Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, supra.
There are certain types of cases where the entity should and is
disregarded. The most numerous class is the formation of "dummy"
corporations to defraud creditors. Booth v. Bunce, supra, is a clear
example of this class. Hibernia Ins. Co..v. St. Louis & New Orleans
Trans. Co., 13 F. 516. Another type is where one corporation is so
organized and controlled by another as to make it a mere agent so
that the court will disregard its separate existence as an entity altogether. Hunter v. Baker Motor Vehicle Co., 225 F. 1006; affirmed
in Baker Motor Vehicle Co. v. Hunter, 238 F. 894. Also the corporate
veil is pierced to prevent the violation of a statute or the modification
of its purport. United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 257;
United States v. Milwaukee Refr. Transit Co., 142 R. 247.
In conclusion it can be said as was said in U. S. v. Wilwaukee
Refr. Transit Co., supra, "that although the general rule is that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity, yet when the entity theory
is used to defeat public convenience, to defraud creditors, to evade an
existing obligation to circumvent a statute, to defend crime, to achieve
or perpetuate monopoly and restraint of trade, then the law will draw
aside the entity and look to stockholders and do justice between the
real parties."
W. C. W.
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COURTS-PLEADINGs-DETrnniNNG JuRismIoxOAL AaoUiNT.-Suit
surety company to recover $568.68. A writing filed with the petition
part of it showed that the plaintiff was not entitled to an amount
would bring it within the court's jurisdiction. Held: That the
was properly dismissed although the sum alleged in the petition
of a sufficient amount to give the court jurisdiction, yet the writfiled with the petition unimpeached and unexplained, and con-
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tradicting it will control. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Mason
Construction Co., 230 Ky. 744, 20 S. W. (2d) 735.
The general rule is that the amount in the case sought to be recovered, rather than the amount which the plaintiff shows himself entitled to recover, will determine the jurisdiction of the court. Montgomery v. Glascock, (Ky.) 121 S. W. 668; Losono v. Tarres, Tex. Civil
App., 234 S. W. 151; Bowen v. Hendricks, 27 Ga. App. 237, 107 S. E.
617; Sunset Lumber Co. v. Dunlop, 32 Cal. App. 492, 163 P. 338; Hutchinson v. Courtney, 86 Fla. 556, 98 So. 582; Norfok & S. R. . Co. v.
Newbren Iron Works & Supply Co., 72 N. C. 188, 90 S. E. 149. ELven
where part of the demand is struck out leaving an amount less than
the jurisdictional sum without amending the petition the court will
have jurisdiction, Denham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 27 Ky.
Law Rep. 999, 87 S. W. 788. In Trustees of Graded Free Colored
Schools of City of Mayfield v. Trustees of Graded Free White Common
Schools of City of Mayfield, 108 Ky. 574, 203 S. W. 520, the sum demanded in all the paragraphs of the petition, totaled, ainounted to the
jurisdictional amount. A demurrer was sustained to all the paragraphs
except the one asking for $13.00. This was much below the amount
necessary to give the court jurisdiction yet it was held that the court
would have jurisdiction of the case. A claim computed on the highest
market price and demanded is sufficiently meritorious to give jurisdiction although the contract price was not a sufficient amount.
C. R. Garner & Co. v. Riley, (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. 953. Am abandonment of the larger claim and contending for a smaller sum will
not defeat the jurisdiction of the court.
As to what part of the pleading is determinative of the jurisdictional amount is a question of more difficulty. In the principal case
the writing attached to the petition was the determining factor.
Where the petition asks for the jurisdictional amount, but on its face
discloses that the plaintiff is not entitled to such an amount, the court
will not have jurisdiction, Youngblood v. Independent Order of
Puritans, (Tex. Civ. App.) 197 S. W. 1116. If the action is for several
separate and distinct torts joined in the same action and no one of
them Is for the jurisdictional amount, although all taken together are
of a sufficient amount, the court will not have jurisdiction. Director
General of Railways v. Wilford, 81 Fla- 430, 88 So. 256. The amount
demanded is not conclusive, but the allegations of facts are determinative, and where the allegations of fact show that less than the jurisdictional amount is in controversy, the court will not have jurisdiction, Consolidated Adjustment Co. of California v. The Superior Court
of Sonoma County, 189 Cal. 92, 207 P. 552. In this case the.prayer was
for a sufficient amount but it was not determinative.
The amount of damages stated in the ad damnum clause of the
declaration does not determine the jurisdiction of the court when the
real demand or value of the property otherwise clearly appears and the
amount in the ad damnum is in excess of the real demand, Seaboard
Air Line Railway Co. v. Maxey, 64 Fla. 487, 60 So. 353.

IKENTUCY LAW JouRNA
The general rule that the amount demanded will determine the
jurisdiction is limited in so far that if the petition shows on its face
or if from the allegations of fact it clearly appears that the amount
in controversy is not sufficient the court will have no jurisdiction.
Considered in this light the Kentucky court in the principal case is
in line with the weight of authority. The writing in that case attached to the petition was the contract between the plaintiff and defendant, and under the circumstances necessarily determined the
amount in controversy,
K. F.
Cn inAL LAW-CHANGE OF VEN-.,--x-ABus, or DIscRETloNiay Taiut
CoUmT.-Appellant H. was convicted of the crime of malicious shooting
with intent to kill M. in Magoffin county, and sentenced to serve two
years in prison. The Commonwealth filed a petition for a change of
venue, alleging only that the defendant was related to the Arnetts and
Howards, who "are two of the most extensively related families in Magoffin county, and likewise are very active and influential families,
and that on account of such relation is believed it will be impractical and almost impossible to obtain a fair and impartial trial of the
case." To sustain allegations of the petition the commonwealth called
only the defendant's father, and he merely testified that he and his
wife had numerous relations in the county. The court transferred the
case, over defendant's objection, to B. county. On call for trial there
defendant moved to remand the case to Magoffin county, but his motion
was overruled. Held, on appeal judgment reversed, with directions to
set aside the order granting a change of venue; neither the petition
nor evidence presented justified the change of venue, and in the exercise of a reasonable, sound discretion should have been overruled.
Howard v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 707, 20 S. W. (2d) 721.
Under Ky. Stats., sec. 1109, both counsel for the prosecution and
defense are entitled to a change of venue when upon motion of either
the trial court is satisfied that a fair tridl cannot be had. The above
statute lodges a sound discretion in the trial court in granting or
refusing an application for a change of venue in a criminal case, and
while such discretion will be reviewed on appeal, there will be no re'versal unless upon examination of the whole record it appears that the
trial court abused its discretion. This is seen to be the decided weight
of authority in the state in the following cases: Graham v. Commonwealth, 252 S. W. 1012, 200 Ky. 161; Whitson v. Commonwealth, 197
Ky. 745, 247 S W.. 979; Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 229, 263
S. W. 752.
The purpose of the Constitution and statutes was to secure to
both the accused and the Commonwealth on equal terms the opportunity to have a fair trial by a jury free from the influence of any
prevailing prejudice or popularity, and when the judge is satisfied
by the petition of the attorney for the Commonwealth that such a trial
cannot be had in the county in which the prosecution is pending he
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is authorized to transfer it .to another county. Robertson's New Ky.
Criminal Law and Procedure, see. 165.
Although there are considerably less cases on the question, the
prosecution may secure a change of venue as may the defense in this
state, yet there appears to be a more strict limitation upon the discretion of the trial court in granting the change to the prosecution,
as seen in Wallace v. Commonwealth, 167 Ky. 277, 180 S. W. 381.
This phase of the Kentucky rule is followed in the recent Michigan
case of People v. Burns, 242 Mich. 345, 218 N. W. 704.
The reason for such limitation may be based upon the fact thau
in several jurisdictions the cases in which the prosecution is allowed
a change of venue are limited to only where it is affirmatively shown
that a fair and impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county, as in
the case, State v. Holloway, 19 N. M. 528, 146 P. 1066.
Some jurisdictions go so far as to confine the allowing of a change
of venue to the defendant only, as is noted in Miller v. People, 230
II. 65, 82 N. E. 521.
The above distinction is based upon the right of the defendant to
be tried in the county where he is domiciled and that right will be
preserved whenever possible unless the accused himself asks for the
change of venue.
A. J. A.

CnmmAL LAw-UsE OF PioTOGnAPHs I TRIAL rOR MTURDE -A shot
and killed B. A was indicted for murder, convicted for manslaughter,
and condemned to serve a term in the penitentiary. One of the grounds
for reversal on appeal was the introduction in evidence of correct
photographs taken of the car in which B was riding at the time of the
killing. These were taken a few days thereafter. Held: They were
admissible. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 387, 19 (2d) S. W.
1086.
Photographs are introduced to show representations of things
which cannot be as conveniently and clearly described by witnesses.
The law concerning such use of photographs is well settled in Kentucky. There are however at least three limitations recognized by
the Kentucky court. 1. The photograph before it can be introduced
must be shown to be correct. Elmendorf v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky.
410; McCandless v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 310. 2. The photograph
must be important, competent, and relevant. Cox v. Commonwealth,
215 Ky. 585, 286 S. W. 689. In the instant case the automobile was
not available at trial. Therefore the photograph was competent, relevant and important. 3. The photograph must not be prejudicial.
Alder v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 613, 286 S. W. 696. In the case under
discussion, the photograph shed no light upon the guilt or innocence of
the accused and consequently cannot be said to be prejudicial.
Under the general rule, photographs and pictures are put on a
par with diagrams, maps, and plans. Any plan or picture may be
admitted in the discretion of the court. Sellers v. State, 21 Ark. 175,
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120 S. W. 840. They aid the jury in understanding the evidence of the
witnesses by illustrating the situations of the persons, places, or things
connected with the subject matter of the inquiry. People v. Durant,
116 Calif. 179, 48 P. 75. They rest to some extent upon the credit of
the witnesses, but this alone should not make them objectionable.
Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 189 Ill. 89, 59 N. E. 573. The same
limitations recognized by the Kentucky court are adhered to by other
jurisdictions. Dixon v. U. S., 7 (2d) F. 818; Wilson v. U. S., 162
U. S. 613; Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass. 192, 62 N. E. 748. Before
photographs can be introduced, extrinsic evidence must be introduced
to show that they are true and faithful representations of the place
or subject at the time involved in the controversy. Young v. State,
144 Ark. 71, 221 S. W. 478; Beardslee v. Columbia Ty., 188 Pa. 496,
41 A. 617. The foundation for its introduction may be laid by anyone
who testifies to its correctness. Whether the photographs come within
the limitation outlined above is to be determined by the judge. His
determination is not open to appellate review by the weight of
authority. Van Hanten v. Mass., 162 Mass. 414, 38 N. . 705; Harris
v. Ansonia, 73 Conn. 359, 47 A. 672, and Carlson v. Benton, 66 Nebr.
496, 92 N. W. 600 illustrate the contra view.
Many types of photographs are admissible. They are admitted
to determine personal identity and appearance either of the murdered
or the murderer. State v. King, 102 Kan. 155, 169 P.,557. They are
also introduced to show the physical condition of persons and animals.
Ex parte Lundy, 204 Ala. 492, 85 S. 821. Then again they are admitted
to show the locus in quo, State v. House, 130 A. (N. H.) 743; People v.
Sliscovich, 193 Calif. 544, 226 P. 611. The photographs have the greatest value if taken at the time of the happening of the subject of the
inquiry. However, photographs taken a month thereafter have been
admitted. Commonwealth v. Carelli, 281 Pa. 602, 127 A. 305.
There is a diversity of opinion as to what type of evidence is a
photograph. Photographs have been held to be secondary evidence.
Banastian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S. W. 921. It seems more logical
to classify them as demonstrative evidence. Commonwealth v. Tucker,
189 Mass. 457, 76 N. E. 127. In the light of the above Kentucky cases,
the latter view seems to be accepted by the Kentucky Court. W. C. W.

Dxscov--ExA=n\A'iox BEFORE TRIAL AS WAM OF WrrNEss'
CoAmLvEro.-In a suit for divorce the wife took the deposition of her
husband as if under cross-examination by virtue of section 606 of the
Civil Code. Held, 'that such action operated as a waiver of the competency of the witness. Gowdy v. Gowdy, 230 Ky. 545, 20 S. W.
(2d) 170.
The precise question involved in this decision confronted the
court in the case of Wilhelm et al. v. Orlameunde's "Administratrix,
228 Ky. 719, 15 S. W. (2d) 511. In that case the court in speaking of
one of the witnesses said, "Upon the question of her competency, we
will say that ordinarily she would not be competent, but the plaintiff
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took her deposition, and thereby waived the question of her competency."
The question as settled by the Kentucky court seems to be fully
supported by the few cases that have been adjudicated on this subject.
Borgess Investment Company v. Vatte, 142 Mo. 560, 44 S. W. 754, 64
A. S. R. 567; Tomlinson v. Elison, 104 Mo. 114, 16 S. W. 207; In re
Estate of Soulard, 43 S. W. 617. In 28 R. C. L. 450 it is said, "It has
been ruled that if a plaintiff takes the defendant's deposition in a
case in which he is incompetent to testify, this is an irrevocable waiver
of his competency, and he may be permitted subsequently to testify
in his own behalf on the trial of the cause, whether the deposition Is
read in evidence or not." This is in accord with the decision in the
case of Borgess Investment Company v. Vette, 142 Mo. 560, 44 S. W.
754, 64 A. S. R. 567, where the deposition was taken but never used,
yet held to constitute a waiver. It is very doubtful whether the rule
of the instant case would apply in Kentucky in a situation where a
party has taken the deposition of his adversary for purposes of discovery, but has not introduced the deposition in evidence, for in all
the Kentucky cases to date, certain it is that the Kentucky court has
recognized a vital distinction between the taking of a deposition for
purposes of discovery and the use of the same for evidence. Willis v.
Bank of Hardinsburg, 160 Ky. 808, 170 S. W. 188; Western Union Telegraph Company v. Williams, 129 Ky. 515, 12 S. W. 653.
One objection sometimes made to the taking of the deposition of
an adversary before trial is that it permits one party to know in
advance what the other will offer in evidence and thus better enable
him to meet it. This can be answered, however, by observing that the
same privilege is open to both parties and either may take advantage
of it. To hold that the taking of a deposition of an opponent is not
a waiver of Incompetency would be to permit one party to a suit to
secure the evidence of the other and at the same time prevent the introduction of such testimony in evidence on the trial. It is submitted
that the ruling of the instant case is sound both upon principle and
D. E. A.
authority.
ELECTIONS-CONTESTS-.RIGHT

OF A CANDIDATE, NOT A PARTY TO THE

CONTEsT, BuT wuo REcEivED PLURALITY OF VOTES, To BE DEcLARED Wn N.s.-In Republican primary in Magoffin county the returns as certified by election officers gave M a plurality. C contested the election and
a recount by the court showed that C received more votes than M.
No allegations under the Corrupt Practice Act (Kentucky Statutes, sec.
1656bl et seq.), having been made the candidate receiving the plurality of legal votes cast was entitled to be declared winner. In attemptIng to show that he received a plurality C established by unchallenged
evidence that one P, not a party to the suit, had received a plurality of
votes. Held, that the court should declare neither C nor M nominated
but that they were unable to declare P nominated because he was not
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a party to the suit. Cooper v. Montgomery, 230 Ky. 333, 20 S. W.
(2d) 479.
The court cites Mellon v. Globe, 210 Ky. 711, 276 S. W. 830, as
authority for the proposition that they could not declare a candidate
not a party to the suit nominated. This case while not entirely in
point, being decided under the Corrupt Practice Act, Ky. Stats. sec.
1565bl et seq., is authority for such rule. The court states: "We think
it very clear that in a contest proceeding the court may not declare
one entitled to a nomination who is not a party to the contest proceeding." The present case seems in complete accord with the general
expressions of law found in the Mellon case. However, in spite of the
eminent clarity of this proposition as alluded to in the Mellon case,
no authority therefor is cited by the court and a search of the decisions in this state reveals them to be equally destitute of direct authority for applying such a rule to an election case.
One case in Illinois, Arnold v. Keil, 252 Ill. 340, 96 N. E. 869, contains dicta in accord with the Kentucky rule. There it is said, "Had
it been shown that Tucker (a candidate not a party to the contest
proceeding) had received more votes than either of the other candidates no decree affecting his rights could ].ave been entered as he was
not made a party."
There is multitudinous authority for the proposition that in an
ordinary action at law a judgment cannot be rendered for or against
one not a party, Carpenter v. Moorelock, 151 Ky. 506, 152 S. W. 575;
Phillips v. Williamson, 184 Ky. 396, 212 S. W. 121.
The difficulty in the instant case is in finding authority for applying this rule to election contests. The peculiarity of election contests
is pointed out by the fact that it has been held that, strictly speaking,
it is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity, Griffith v. Bonawitz,
73 Nebr. 622, 103 N. W. 327; Thomas v. Franklin, 42 Nebr. 310, 60 N. W.
568. Neither is it a criminal proceeding, Maloney v. Collier, 112 Tenn.
78, 83 S. W. 667.
From the unusual nature of election contests the question naturally arises whether or not the rule as to judgments affecting only
named parties should apply. In answer to this it is suggested that
the general rule supported by a great weight of authority that judgments in election cases must conform to the pleadings as In other
civil cases, Hamer v. Howell, 31 Utah 144, 86 P. 1073; Doss v. Howard,
180 Ky. 413, 202 S. W. 888. It has been noted that in other civil cases
judgment cannot be rendered under the pleadings for a person not a
party to the suit. Williams v. Hamilton, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 795, 29 S. W.
873; Likens v. Pate, 160 Ky. 319, 169 S. W. 734; or against one not a
party, Day v. Burnham, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 292, 11 S. W. 807; Sanson v.
Connolly, 141 Ky. 120, 132 S. W. 159.
It is submitted that the most logical conclusion from the above
premises is the rule of the instant case, and that the candidate shown
to have received a plurality of votes has no right to be declared winner
by the court in a contest to which he was not a party.
R. M. 0. •

CASE COMIMENTS
TRusTs-DEwsE UPoN ORATL TRUST.-The deceased made an oral
agreement with his wife whereby he promised to devise certain property to her, and she, in turn, promised to devise it to the plaintiff. The
wife received the property by the huband's will, but at her death devised it to the defendant. Plaintiff sues in equity to recover the
property.
Held: "An agreement between a testator and a devisee that the
devisee will dispose of the property in a certain way is enforceable if
the property was devised to him because of such an agreement." The
devisee in such a ease holds the property of the decedent in trust for
the use and benefit of the one to whom he agreed to devise the property.
Shader's Ex'r et al. v. Shader, 228 Ky. 374, 15 S. W. (2d) 246.
The Kentucky court laid down no new doctrine in this case, but
followed what seems always to have been the law in this state. In a
land-mark case the court says that an implied trust is excepted from
the statute of frauds, and a refusal of the devisee to convey according
to the oral agreement is a constructive fraud. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 7
Bush (Ky.) 515; Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108, 176 S. W. 942; Chapman's Ex'r v. Chapman, 152 Ky. 344, 153 S. W. 434; Taylor v. Fox's
Ex'r. 162 Ky. 804, 173 S. W. 154; Rudd v. Gates, 191 Ky. 456,. 230 S.
W. 906.
While the rule in the principal case is in accord with the weight
of authority in this country, it has been severely criticised in that it
violates not only the Statute of Frauds but also the Statute of Wills.
Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared, 37 Harvard
However, possibly the rule does not violate
Law Review, 653 (671).
the Statute of Frauds in Kentucky, for it has been held that section 7
of the Statute has never been in force in this state. Smith v. Smith,
D. D D.
121 S. W. (Ky.) 1002; Sherley v. Sherley, 97 Ky. 512.
W=S-WETHER TyrEwnrrrT WiL Is HOLOGRAPHIC.-A resident
of Kentucky was killed by a railroad train in Florida. There was
found on his person at time of death a typewritten paper in form of a
will, to which the name "E. T. Adams" was subscribed with pen and
ink, but no witness subscribed it. The paper was admitted to probate and an appeal taken to the circuit court. Two sons of A. testified that four months before his death A. stated he was going to write
his will, and went to his typewriter and wrote something, the sons did
not see what was written at such time. Held, judgment of county
court allowing the probate reversed. A will unsubscribed by witnesses
to its execution or acknowledgment and written entirely by typewriter
Is not valid. Adams' Executor, et aL. v. Beaumont, 226 Ky. 311, 10 S.
W. (2nd) 1106.
Under Ky. Stats., Sec. 4828, "no will shall be valid unless it is
in writing with the name of the testator subscribed thereto by himself, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction;
and, moreover, if not wholly written by the testator, the subscription

306

KENTucxy LAww JouRNAL

shall -be made or will acknowledged by him in the presence of at
lease two credible witnesses, who shall subscribe the will with their
names in the presence of the testator."
It is true that this case cannot be strongly supported with judicial
decisions in this state, yet the fact that the question has not been
raised heretofore, coupled with the above quoted statute should be sufficient substantiation for the holding.
Before considering cases in other jurisdictions upon the question
we shall note two cases in this state which although not directly in
point may throw some light on the subject.
In Gregory v. Oates, 92 Ky. 532, although it did not appear what
part of the will was not in the handwriting of the testatrix, the will
was held invalid because not wholly in the writing of the testatrix.
We find a statement in Rutledge v. Wiggington, et at., 166 Ky. 421,
179 S. W. 389, to effect that, "a will to be valid as holographic must
be wholly in the handwriting of the testator."
Although there are few cases which may be cited as authority for
the holding in the case at bar, this writer has been able to find only
one case holding contra and that one only by a citation and not in
the original reports. The citation for that case is, Arid et vir Rap.
Jud. Quebec, 28 C. S. 235, and is given as holding, where a typewritten
testament signed by the testator was held to be valid as holographic
will, tho it was provided by statute that such a will must be entirely
written and signed by the testator. Standing alone with no justification
or surrounding circumstances this one decision cannot be given much
weight.
The holding of the case at bar is substantiated in the case of In re
Dreyfus' Estate, 175 Cal. 417, 165 Pac. 941, where under similar facts
the will was held invalid. It was therein stated "while it is true that
a will made wholly by the testator and by means of a typewriter may
be said to have been made by the hand of the testator himself, it
would not be true, accurately speaking, that such a will had been
written by him. The process of making letters on paper with a typewriter is essentially a process of printing. The type fixed on a bar is
stained with ink and then pressed against the paper, leaving its imprint precisely as in a printing press."
A. J. A.

